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THE COURTS' DISCRETION IN ASSESSING
FEES UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ATIORNEy'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976
Lmda F Thome*

1.

INTRODUCTION

The Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 19761 provIdes
for an award of fees to the prevailing party by the court "in its dis
cretIon. In order to assess the bounds of thIS discretIon, it IS nec
essary first to examme the ongm of the Act and the context m
whICh it was passed.
The Act was direct congressIOnal reactIon to the United States
Supreme Court's declSlon m Alyeska Pipeline Sermce Co. v.
Wilderness Socfety 2 That deCISIOn abruptly ended the federal
courts practIce of awarding attorney s fees to prevailing partIes m
CIvil nghts and other public mterest cases under the pnvate attor
ney general doctrme where there was no express statutory authon
zatIon for such awards. It also resulted m an mconsistency m the
availability of fee awards m suits brought under the federal CIvil
nghts laws because some statutes provIded for fees while others
did not. 3
The legIslatIve hIstory of the Act makes clear that its purpose
was to remedy anomalous gaps
and to achIeve conSIstency m
Staff Attorney Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law' B.A., UnIver
sity of ChIcago, 1972; J.D., George WashIngton UnIversity, 1978.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The statute proVIdes In relevant part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce
prOVISIOn of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of thIS title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or In any
CIvil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of Amenca,
to enforce, or chargIng VIOlation of, proVISIOn of the United States Inter
nal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, In
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
reasonable attorney fee as part of the costs.
Id.
2. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
3. Among those statutes with prOVISIOn for fees are: Titles II, and VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1976); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Id. § 3612(c) (1976); the Emergency School AId Act of 1972,
20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); and the Voting Rights Act ExtenSIOn of 1975, 42 U.S.C.
§ 19731(e) (1976).
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our CIvil nghts laws. 4 The prOVISIOn was to be mterpreted m ac
cordance with the eXIstmg case law under both the earlier statutory
prOVlSlons and the JudicIally fashIOned pnvate attorney general doc
tnne. 5 The courts have recogmzed thIs legIslative desIre to achIeve
consIstency and have generally adopted, as controlling, the pnnCI
pIes whICh were established under the fee provlSlons of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. Thus, Newman v. Piggte Park Enterpnses 6 and
Johnson v. Georgta Highway Express, Inc. 7 and other cases under
Title II and Title VII of the 1964 Act, are repeatedly cited by
courts seekmg standards for fee awards under section 1988. The
legIslative hIstory also recogmzes the compelling need for fee
awards m CIvil nghts actions as a part of the overall federal enforce
ment scheme. 8 The reasonmg m the Senate Report echoes that of
4. S. REP No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), repnnted In [1976] 5 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908.
5. The Idea of the pnvate attorney general" IS not new one, nor are at
torneys fees
new remedy. Congress has commonly authonzed attorneys
fees ill laws under whlCh pnvate attorneys general" play significant role
m enforcmg our poliCies.
These fees shifting prOV1SlOns have been successful m enabling vigor
ous enforcement of modern Civil nghts legislation, while at the same time
limiting the growth of the enforcement bureaucracy. Before May 12, 1975,
when the Supreme Court handed down its declslOn m Alyeska Pipeline
Serolce Co. v. Wilderness SocIety, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); many lower Federal
courts throughout the Nation had drawn the ObVlOUS analogy between the
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts and these modern Civil nghts acts, and, fol
lowmg CongresslOnal recognition m the newer statutes of the pnvate attor
ney general" concept, were exerclsmg their traditional equity powers to
award attorneys fees under early Civil nghts laws as well.
These pre-Alyeska deClslOns remedied
gap m the specific statutory
prOV1SlOns and restored an Important hlstonc remedy for Civil nghts vlOla
tions.
It IS mtended that the standards for awarding fees be generally the same
as under the fee prOVlSlOns of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seekmg to
enforce the nghts protected by the statutes covered by S. 2278, if successful,
should ordinarily recover an attorney fee unless special Clrcumstances
would render such an award unjust. Newman v. Piggle Park Enterpnses,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
S. REP., supra note 4, at 3-4, reprinted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
5908, 5910-12.
6. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
7. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. All of these Civil nghts laws depend heavily upon pnvate enforcement,
and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if pnvate citizens are to
have meamngful opportunity to vmdicate the Important CongresslOnal pol
ICies whlCh these laws contam.
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the Supreme Court m Newman. 9
The reality of cIvil nghts litIgatIon confirms the Importance of
pnvate enforcement and the need for adequate fee awards. Dunng
the year ending June 30, 1978, over mnety-eight percent of all cIvil
nghts actIons filed m federal distnct courts were brought by pn
vate plamtiffs.lO These cases may take years to resolve,l1 wIth re
peated demands upon the bme, resources, and skills of plamtiffs
counsel. Issues, both legal and factual, are complex, often re
qumng the testImony of one or more expert witnesses as well as
paralegal aSSIstance m prepanng for tnal. 12 Costs are correspond
mgly hIgh. Finally even m seemmgly clear-cut cases, success can
not be assured as legal standards are constantly reexammed by the
courts. 13
In many cases anSIng under our Civil nghts laws, the citizen who must
sue to enforce the law has little or no money with whICh to hire lawyer. If
pnvate citizens are to be able to assert their Civil nghts, and if those who VI
olate the Nation fundamental laws are not to proceed with Impunity, then
citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to Vindicate
these nghts In court.
S. REP supra note 4, at 2, repnnted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
5908,5910.
9. When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was eVident that en
forcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely In
part upon pnvate litigation as
means of secunng broad compliance with
the law. A Title II suit IS thus pnvate In fonn only When plaintiff bnngs
an action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an in
pnvate attorney gen
Junction, he does so not for himself alone but also as
eral, Vindicating policy that Congress conSidered of the highest pnority
If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorney
fees, few aggneved parties would be In position to advance the public in
terest by invoking the Injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress
therefore enacted the proVISIOn for counsel fees-not Simply to penalize liti
gants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but,
more broadly, to encourage indiViduals Injured by raCial discnmlnation to
seek JudiCial relief under Title II.
390 U.S. at 401-02 (footnote omitted).
10. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REpORT OF THE
DIRECTOR A-16, table C.2 (1978).
11. For example, an employment discnmlnation class action was brought under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; suit was filed In 1966, tnal was held In 1974,
and, In 1977 plaintiffs moved for an award of mtenm attorneys fees; the case IS not
yet resolved. James V. Stockham Valve & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
12. In one title VII case tned In 1979, tnallasted 3 weeks and reqUired the tes
timony, for plaintiffs, of computer programmer, statistician, and an mdustnal psy
chologist. Exhibit preparation reqUired the assistance of 11 temporary employees,
who worked over penod of several months to analyze over 40,000 documents. The
case has been pending since 1972. Pegues
MiSSISSIPPI State Employment Serv.,
No. 72-4-8 (N.D. Miss. 1979) (under adVisement July 27 1979).
13. The Burger Court has made number of Inroads Into established" JudiCial
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The result of these factors IS that manv plamtiffs and attorneys
are reluctant to start down the uncertam path of litIgatIon. While
many cIvil rIghts cases may be resolved qUIckly and with little ex
pense, it may be difficult to distmgUIsh, m advance, the sImple
case from the one whICh will reqUIre multIple appeals and years to
close. Because few cIvil rIghts plamtiffs can afford to pay theu at
torneys as well as the costs of litIgatIon as the proceedings con
tmue, most attorneys must wait until the final resolutIon of the
case to get theIr fee and to recover theu own disbursements. Even
then, of course, fees and costs will be awarded only if the plamtiff
prevails. To add to thIS uncertamty by limitmg the CIrcumstances
under whIch fees are to be awarded or by limitmg the award itself
would undermme the mtent of the Act. It would, mdeed, under
mme the entIre legIslatIve cIvil rIghts mandate, whICh the Con
gress has made dependent upon prIvate litIgatIon.
The Senate Report recogmzed that m a practIcal sense, the ex
pectatIon that the cIvil rIghts laws will be enforced by prIvate litI
gants relies upon the ability of those litIgants to attract competent
counsel. 14 The adversary system itself IS based on the assumptIon
that both partIes to litIgatIon will be represented by attorneys capa
ble of presentmg theIr clients positIOns m the most favorable pos
ture. The gUIding pnnciple m determmmg fee awards must be to
place the serVIces of a plamtiffs CIvil rIghts lawyer on a par with
those of counsel m comparably difficult areas of law 15
II.

DETERMINING WHETHER TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES

The Supreme Court's declSlon m Newman limited the Court's
discretIOn m decIding whether to award fees to prevailing plamtiffs
m cases brought under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.lS
One who succeeds m obtammg an mJunctIon under that Title
should ordinarily recover an attorney s fee unless speCIal Circum
prmclples m the Civil nghts area. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S.,
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
14. S. REP supra note 4, at 6, reprtnted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5913.
15. It IS mtended that the amount of fees awarded under S. 2278 be gov
erned by the same standards whICh prevail m other types of equally com
plex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases and not be reduced because
the nghts mvolved may be nonpecumary m nature.
In computing the
fee, counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as IS traditional with attor
neys compensated by fee-paymg client, "for all time reasonably expended
on matter.
Id. (citations omitted).
16. 390 U.S. at 402.
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stances would render such an award unJust. "17 ThIS holding was
extended by the Court to fee awards under title VII In Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody 18 and to awards under section 718 of the
Emergency School AId Act of 197219 In Northcross v. Board of Ed
ucatwn.20 The Senate Report cites Newman and states that thIs
pnnciple should also apply under section 1988. 21
Accordingly most of the controversy In the lower courts has
ansen with regard to the definitIOn of the specIal circumstances
whIch would render such an award unJust. In addition, some
courts have held that a fee award IS Inappropnate where the plam
tiff has sought only damages rather than Injunctive relief. Finally
others have confronted the problem of whether federally funded le
gal serVICes groups are entitled to an award.
Some courts have found such a specIal circumstance where
the defendant has relied upon a state law or agency ruling m mam
tammg the policy whICh the plamtiff has successfully challenged.
ThIS situation typICally occurs m sex discnmmatIon actions concern
mg retirement plans or female protective laws. 22 The Ninth Circuit,
however, rejected thIS rationale m Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific
Co 23
Under umque CIrcumstances m Sprogts v. United Atr Ltnes 24
fees were demed. There, the Seventh Circuit upheld the distnct
court's demal of fees when it found that the real party In mterest m
the suit was not the named plamtiff but rather her umon, whICh
had retamed counsel and borne all the expenses of the litigation.
17 Id.
18. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976).
20. 412 U.S. 427 (1973).
21. S. REP supra, note 4, at 4, reprinted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5912.
22. Chastang V. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Williams V.
General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974).
23. 519 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1975).
Reading § 713(b) to bar allowance of attorneys fees whenever good faith re
liance could be shown would deter pnvate suits challengmg suspect EEOC
Interpretations of Title VII. At best, such suits are unattractive to pnvate liti
gants. The Issues are often complex; the deference accorded the agency m
terpretatIon of its govermng statute makes success unlikely Yet it IS particu
larly Important that pnvate litigants submit such Issues to the courts for
determmation, for the agency itself will not do so. The agency declined to
proceed In thiS case, for example, but thiS prIvate litigation resulted In
hIghly significant contribution to the effective enforcement of the Act.
Id. at 529-30.
24. 517 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. HI75).
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Further the actIon was found to be a CIrcumventIon of a settle
ment agreement whICh the umon and the defendant had reached
shortly before filing a test case desIgned In conjunctIon with other
litIgatIon InvolvIng the same substantIve Issues. Because the de
fendant had not known of the umon s positIon and mIght have had
a different strategy if it had, the court held it to be unfau to assess
fees agamst it. The court found three additIonal factors militatmg
agaInst a fee award:
1. The case was not tYPICal of the CIvil nghts claIms usually
brought by public mterest orgamzatIons;
2. the attorneys fees claIm was not related to the damages re
covered; and
3. m light of the other litigation pending, the declSlon III the
case had little precedenhal value. 25

The latter two conSIderatIons are more commonly factors whICh
courts examme In determInIng the amount of a fee award. Interest
mgly the Seventh Circuit's evaluatIon of the precedentIal value of
the case has proved to be Incorrect. SprogfS IS frequently cited and
IS a leading sex discnmInatIon case under title VII.
A second Issue ansIllg III the use of the Newman standard IS
whether the Newman mandate applies only to cases In whICh an Ill
JunctIon, rather than monetary relief alone, has been achIeved. At
least three cucuits have answered thIS questIon III the affirmative
and have approved the demal of fees, reasomng that no public Ill
terest has been served or that the plaIntiff's monetary recovery
would be suffiCIent to pay hIS attorney 26 In Parham v. Southwest
ern Bell Telephone Co. 27 the Eighth Circuit recogmzed that thIS
reasomng mIght be myopIC. Although no InjunctIon had Issued, the
court found that the lawsuit acted as a catalyst, leading the defen
dant to comply voluntarily Therefore, the plaIntiff was entitled to
a fee award.
The Seventh Circuit's mIstaken prediction of the precedentIal
value of Sprogfs IS Illstruchve III thIS regard. It may be difficult for
a court or for the parties to Judge the Impact of a gIven case, either
as precedent or III its effect upon the defendant's future actIOns.

25. Id. at 391.
26. Buxton
Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976));
Zarcone
Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cen. demed, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979)
(§ 1988); Reid
MemphiS Publishmg Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975) (title VII).
27. 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970) (title VII).
28. 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)).

1979]

ASSESSING FEE AWARDS

289

For example, In Buxton v. Patel,28 a fau hOUSIng case, the court
found that the discnmInatIon suffered by the plaIntiffs was an Isola
ted IncIdent, with no IndicatIon of broader VIOlatIons generally af
fectIng the public. There was no consIderatIon of the effect that
case mIght have In preventIng future Isolated InCIdents regarding
the same defendant, or more pervaSIve discnmmatIon by other
landlords who mIght hear about the lawsuit. Indeed, the award of
monetary relief In a CIvil nghts case may often have a much greater
Impact on the public Interest than the Issuance of an InJunctIon, by
deterrIng conduct SImilar to the defendant's by others who WIsh to
protect theIr pocketbooks.
In Sargeant v. Sharp 29 the First Circuit squarely rejected the
contentIon that the plaIntiff's ability to pay hIs attorney s fee out of
an award of damages should be a factor m the deCISIOn to award or
not to award a fee. Ability to pay IS a factor whICh may be conSId
ered only In settIng the amount of the fee or In makIng the award
to the plaIntiff rather than to the attorney
Finally it should be noted that m adoptIng the Newman
standard, the Senate Report omitted all reference to any reqUIre
ment that the plaIntiff obtaIn an InjunctIon In order to tngger the
presumptIon of entitlement to a fee award. Instead, it refers only
to the necessity of success In seekmg to enforce the nghts pro
tected by the statutes covered. "30
A thud Issue relatIng to the award of fees was spawned by the
statute s preclUSIOn of fee awards to the federal government. Be
cause many legal serVIces and CIvil nghts groups are at least par
tIally federally funded, it IS argued that they too, must be demed
fees. The Second Circuit resolved thIS questIon In Equal Employ
ment Opportumty Commtsswn v Steamfitters Local 638,31 where
it upheld the tnal court's fee award to the NatIonal Employment
Law Project (NELP). Although NELP receIved money from the
Equal Employment Opportunity CommIsSIOn (EEOC), the court
reasoned that NELP was not the federal government. Moreover it
could not be known how long the orgamzatIon s federal funding
would contInue,32 or whether Congress mIght not have Intended
that such groups become self-sustaInIng through recovery of attor

29. Sargeant Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976».
30. S. REP supra note 4, at 4, reprmted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5912.
31. 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977).
32. In fact, it termmated m 1978.
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neys fees. 33 The court of appeals, however did approve the lower
court's reduction of the fees to be awarded to NELP The questIOn
of the amount of fee awards to federally and prIvately funded or
gamzatIons IS a live one.
The trIal courts discretIon, then, m determmmg whether to
award fees, has been substantially limited. The courts of appeals
have not hesitated to reverse and remand the demal of fees where
there was msufficlent JustificatIOn for it. 34
III.

DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE A WARD

The courts have much greater discretIon m determmmg the
amount of a fee award then m decIding whether to make an award
at all. The legIslatIve hIstory of the Act, nevertheless, makes it
clear that there are certam conSIderations whIch must be taken mto
account. First, the prOVISIOn for fee awards was mtended to act as
an mcentIve to attract competent counsel to cIvil rIghts litIgatIOn.
Fee awards are to be governed by the same standards prevailing m
other complex federal litIgatIon. 35 Second, the Senate Report cited
Johnson 36 as settmg forth the proper standards 37 and stated that
these standards had been correctly applied m Stanford Daily
33. See also Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219, 220 (1st Cir. 1974) (pnvate attorney
general doctnne) (held no abuse of discretion to deny fees to federally funded Le
gal Aid Society where pnvate counsel was also assOCiated and received an award). If
no pnvate counsel had been mvolved, however, the First Circuit stated that award to
the Legal Aid group would have been reqUired. Id. at 221.
34. See, e.g., Bunn v. Central Realty of La., 592 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979) (trial
court must conSider 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir.
1977) (award not to be denIed because no proof of value of services presented at trial
or because no proof of plamtiffs ability to pay); Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274
(5th Cir. 1977) (award not to be demed because conduct was negligent rather than
mtentional).
35. S. REP supra note 4, at 6, repnnted 'n [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5913.
36. 488 F.2d at 714.
37 488 F.2d at 717-19. Johnson, title VII case, set forth the followmg twelve
factors to be conSidered:
(1) The time and labor reqUired; (2) ilie novelty and difficulty of the ques
tions; (3) the skill reqUisite to perform the legal service properly' (4) the pre
clUSIOn of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
(5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee IS fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations Imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount m
volved and the results obtamed; (9) the expenence, reputation, and ability of
the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) ilie nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards m
Similar cases.
Id.
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v. Zurcher 38 Van Davts v. County of Los Angeles 39 and Swann v
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educatwn. 40
In Stanford Daily the court awarded a fee of $50 per hour for
750 hours and added a bonus of $10,000 because of the conhn
gency of success and because the case mvolved novel Issues whIch
were well presented by counse1. 41 The total award was $47,500. 42
It rejected arguments that the award should have been reduced
because the plamtiffs did not succeed m obtammg all of the relief
they sought. Determmmg that fees should be awarded for all tIme
reasonably computed to promote theIr clients mterests, the court
reasoned that it should not reqUIre attorneys to foresee "the exact
parameters of the courts willingness to grant relief. 43
The Van Davts 44 court also awarded a bonus, attributed to the
excellent results and difficulty of the case as well as the conduct of
the plamtiffs attorneys. It refused to reduce the award because the
plamtiffs did not prevail on all Issues, adoptmg the positIon that
fees should be awarded for all tIme reasonably expended. 45 Nor
was the fee reduced because two of the attorneys worked for a
non-profit public mterest law firm. The total award was reduced
slightly by $1,000 because of duplicatIon of effort and by 25 hours
or $875 because of poor record-keepmg by one lawyer The total
award of $60,000 mcluded $9,670 for paralegal and law clerk tIme
at $10 per hour $3,268.68 for expenses, and $7 193.32 for a result
charge or bonus. Attorneys were awarded $35 to $60 per hour 46
In Swann, the total award exclUSIve of expenses was $175,000
for more than 2,700 hours of attorney tIme. 47 The court found it Ir
relevant that the plamtiffs had no contractual obligatIon to pay
theIr attorneys and that the NAACP Legal Defense Fund had con
tributed expenses and nommal fees to the litIgatIon. 48
In additIon to the Johnson gUIdelines, some courts have fol
lowed antitrust cases 10 whICh fee awards have been made under

38. 64 F.RD. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
39. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 9444, at 5047 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
40. 66 F.RD. 483 (W.O. N.C. 1975).
41. 64 F.RD. at 688.
42.
43.

[d.
[d. at 684.

44. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. at ~ 9444, at 5047
45. [d. at 5049.
46. ld. at 5048.
47 66 F.RD. at 486.
48.

[d.
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the equitable fund doctnne 49 for gUIdance m determmmg the
amount of a fee award m a cIvil nghts achon. The leading case IS
Lmdy Bros. Builders of Philadelphta v. Amencan Radiator & Stan
dard Samtary Corp. 50 In Lmdy I, the Third Circuit held that m
computIng the amount of attorneys fees under the equitable fund
doctnne, the number of hours spent should be multiplied by some
hourly rate reflectmg the complexity and novelty of the Issues, the
quality of the work, and the amount of the recovery obtaIned. 51
The Third Circuit applied Lmdy II to an award of fees under sec
hon 1988 m Hughes v. Repko 52 holding that the first step m
amount determmatlOn was to establish a "lodestar The calculation
of the lodestar mcludes a determInation of the serVIces to be recog
mzed, that IS, how much time should be Included, as well as the
appropnate hourly rate. ConsIderations of the complexity or diffi
culty of the litigatIOn and of the extent to whICh the party prevailed
are mcluded In calculatIng the lodestar Further adjustments are
made In accordance with the purposes of the Act and the standards
set forth mJohnson and Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel. 53
Finally other courts have adopted the award standards set
forth m the ABA s Code of ProfessIOnal Responsibility 54 whICh are
not apprecIably different from the standards suggested In Johnson.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Distnct of ColumbIa Circuit
has developed a novel approach to settIng the amount of fee
awards m cases agaInst the federal government whICh IS a step re
moved from the Johnson and the ABA standards. In Copeland v.
Marshall,55 a panel of that court held that, rather than begmnmg
with an hourly rate and number of hours worked on the case, the
mqUIry should begm with an exammatIOn of the firm s overhead
costs and reasonable profit margms. The panel was particularly
concerned about the relationshIp between the fee award and the
plamtiff's or class s back pay recovery
49. The equitable fund doctnne provides for compensation to those who have
undertaken an action whICh has resulted m benefit to others. The others benefited
are accordingly requITed to contribute to the plamtiffs attorney fees.
50. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lmdy I), appeal from remand, 540 F.2d 102
(3d Cir. 1976) (Lmdy II).
51. Id. at 168.
52. 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978).
53. 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
54. See Waters v. Wisconsm Steel Works of Int'I Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309
(7th Cir. 1974).
55. 18 Fair EmpJ. Cas. 468 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (reheanng en banc scheduled Oct.
21, 1979).

1979]

ASSESSING FEE AWARDS

293

With the exceptIon of the Copeland deCISIOn with respect to
fee awards agaInst the federal government, there IS general agree
ment as to the factors whICh should be conSidered. There IS consid
erable vanatIon, however, In the extent to whICh the appellate
courts will Inject themselves Into the process itself. Nearly every
court recites its acknowledgement that the amount of the award IS
withIn the tnal court's discretIon. 56 Yet some courts have taken a
much more active role than others In reVieWIng the methods by
whICh the tnal Judge sets the award. The Second Circuit, for exam
ple, reqUires that a heanng be held and that the claim be fully
documented. 57 The First,58 ThIrd,59 and Fifth60 Circuits reqUire
findings or some statement of the reasons for the award. In con
trast, both the Fourth61 and Ninth 62 Circuits have upheld lower
court fee determInations whICh were challenged because no find
Ings or reasons were Issued. Close appellate review of course, IS
dependent upon the eXistence of a record below
The appellate courts vary Widely In theIr treatment of fee
awards whICh have been challenged by one of the parties. In Allen
v. Amalgamated Transit Umon,63 the distnct court awarded a fee
of $300 or $4.54 per hour The Eighth Circuit reversed, calling the
award grossly madequate, and recommending to the tnal court the
standards set out m Johnson. ThiS example, of course, IS an ex
treme one. The distnct court apparently Simply chose a dollar
amount with little reference to any of the Johnson factors.
In another Eighth Circuit case, Brown v. Bathke 64 the tnal
56. See, e.g., King
New Hampshne Dep't of Resources and EconomlC Dev.,
562 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1977) (distnct court IS clearly the best Judge of what constitutes
reasonable fee"); Waters
Wisconsm Steel Works of Int'I Harvester Co., 502
F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974) (analYSIS whlCh encompasses conSideration of ABA
standards well withm bounds of discretion); Brito
Zia, Inc., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th
Cir. 1973) (hours not the sole baSIS for determmmg fees, the court usmg its discre
tion sets reasonable fee); Schaeffer
San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002
(9th Cir. 1972) ("large discretion m tnal Judge recogmzed); Lea v. Cone Mills, 467
F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1972) (appellate court will not overrule unless clearly wrong");
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals, 442 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1971) (reasonableness left to
the sound discretion of the tnal Judge).
New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev d on
57. Beazer
other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1355 (1979).
58. Sargeant Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978).
59. Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d at 488-89.
60. Morrow
Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1978).
61. Lea Cone Mills, 467 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1972).
62. Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972).
63. 554 F.2d 876 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 434 U.S. 891 (1977).
64. 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978).
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court had awarded fees only for the tIme expended on the Issue on
whICh the plamtiff had prevailed. ThIs policy of mechamcally divId
mg tIme spent on mterrelated Issues was rejected by the court of
appeals as mconsistent with the liberal purposes of the Act. Al
though the extent to whICh the plamtiff prevailed was a relevant
factor, its conSIderation was to be m accord with the pnncipies of
Van Davts 65 as adopted by the Senate Report,66 that attorneys fees
should not be demed solely because the claIm did not prOVIde the
preCIse basIs for the relief granted. 67
The Second Circuit, m Beazer v. New York City Transtt Au
thonty 68 upheld a fee award of $310,000, but reversed a premmm
of $50,710. Because the tnal court had met all of the reqmrements
of a hearmg and full documentatIOn of the claim, the fee award it
self was upheld. The premmm, however, was held to be an abuse
of discretIon. Although the factual Issues were complex, the legal
Issues were faIrly SImple and the benefits to the class were not con
crete. The court was candidly concerned about the SIze of the total
award and adverted to an earlier pronouncement that fees should
be scrutImzed with an eye to moderatIon.
In King v. Greenblatt 69 the First Circuit upheld the tnal
court's award of $50 per hour or $4,000. In domg so, the appellate
court reversed an earlier case m whICh it had held that the CnmI
nal Justice Act rates of $30 for m-court and $20 for out-of-court
tIme were appropnate for awards m CIvil nghts cases. 70 The au
thority for thIS positIon was the legIslative hIstory of section 1988,
whICh had been passed m the mtenm.71
65. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. at ~ 9444, at 5047
66. S. REP supra note 4, at 6, reprinted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5913.
67 588 F.2d at 637.
New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d CiT. 1977), rev don
68. Beazer
other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1355 (1979).
69. 560 F.2d 1024 (1st CiT. 1977).
70. Souza
Travlsono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(I) (1976)).
7l. Not only has Congress now prOVided for attorney fees awards In Civil
nghts cases, the Act' legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress in
tended not only that the fees be adequate enough to attract competent
counsel" but "that the amount
[would] be governed by the same
standards whICh prevail In other types of equally complex Federal litigation
such as antitrust cases. Mechamcal application of the Cnmmal Justice Act
fee scale obVIOusly does not meet these critena, and we shall therefore no
longer reqUire adherence to Souza.
560 F.2d at lO26 (quoting S. REP supra note 4, at 6, reprinted In [1976] 5 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913).
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After the distrIct court concluded that the hours expanded by
counsel were excessive and thereby reduced the award from 231 to
150 hours, the plamtiffs m Norwood v. Harnson 72 appealed. The
Fifth Circuit upheld the award because the Johnson factors had
been fully considered m its determmatIon.
The problems of calculatmg a fee award vary with every case.
The court must determme whether the time spent was exceSSive,
to what extent and m what way the final result should affect the
award, and at what rate the attorney s time should be valued. Each
of these consideratIOns depends upon the umque ClTcumstances of
each case. As long as these Circumstances are evaluated withm the
Johnson framework, mechamcal formulae for allocatmg time among
Issues are aVOided, and a reasonable rate IS set. The balancmg of
the factors IS then generally left to the court's discretion.
72. 581 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978).

